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Abstract: Maritime cyber security is an emerging issue that requires immediate attention, according to
the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Feedback received from global shipping professionals
indicate that a common threat to the industry, such as cyber security, is dealt with differently among
industry practitioners around the globe. Data collected from two targeted focus groups (one in
Europe and the second in Asia, two leading groups in the maritime transport sector) demonstrated
that, based on technology adoption maturity, cyber security is perceived differently between these
groups. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted these differences. Our findings lead to useful
intelligence that will inform key maritime decision makers, both in meeting the IMO requirements
and preparing the organization to address cyber risks.
Keywords: maritime cyber security; cultural differences; maritime transport sector
1. Introduction
Innovative technologies have found their way to the maritime transport sector as
they minimize the costs and maximize the benefits in everyday operations. At the same
time, these new technologies enhance the interconnectedness of core port and shipping
operations to the whole supply chain. As such, any interruption to the core of these
operations may have a consequent knock-on effect to the wider economy and industries
related to the supply chain, as illustrated in the CyRiM Report [1].
Despite the increasing numbers of cyber incidents to corporate networks and data,
the maritime transport sector is rather slow in addressing cyber risk [2]. Well-established
regulations and guidelines have been implemented for decades on topics such as envi-
ronmental and crew safety and, more recently, on ballast water management; these risks
are tangible. However, cyber risks are different. Their intangible nature means that their
consequences are not palpable; therefore, it is difficult for them to be initially identified
and addressed. Infected applications, computers in the office, or operational technology
(OT) systems on board may continue to operate without any noticeable performance issues.
Unlike any other risk, when a cyber breach occurs, it can affect the entire infrastructure of
an organization, including its fleet and offices around the world.
This threat landscape will only grow, as ships at sea increase their connectivity, ex-
changing data so they can increase supply chain visibility and performance. Unfortunately,
while connectivity solutions have evolved, achieving greater resilience, a single specific
vulnerability in one industry or organization can swiftly cascade to affect other industries
and organizations due to the lack of appropriate security controls [1].
Maritime transport companies are part of a complex supply chain that, at present,
is digitalized. Digitalization is taking place so that performance in the overall supply chain
can be improved [3]. At the same time, shipping companies are providing remote access
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2021, 9, 1323. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse9121323 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/jmse
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2021, 9, 1323 2 of 17
to on-board systems to third party service providers and vendors for software updates,
performance monitoring, and maintenance [4]. These two intertwined activities increase
the cyber-attack surface. It is not a farfetched scenario in which a critical cloud service
provider or even a satellite communications services provider could be interrupted or
ceased altogether because of a cyber breach. Such incidents could cascade on a global
scale and impact all economic activities. The most profound example is the NotPetya
malware attack in July 2017, which had a huge impact on global economic activities,
costing approximately $892.5 million [5]. Research institutes and regulatory authorities are
struggling to model, let alone quantify, cyber risk, mainly due to the lack of relevant data.
When the threats move at the speed of light, they can be hard to comprehend.
In other leading industries, such as banking, manufacturing, retail, and healthcare,
boards of directors and executive leadership are gradually becoming more aware of the
cyber threat to their businesses and the need to manage cyber security at the enterprise
level. A 2020 survey conducted by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association
(ISACA) [6] found that 82% of respondents understood the board of directors to be “con-
cerned” or “very concerned” about cyber security. Similarly, in shipping, as our research
identified and demonstrates in Figures 1 and 2, more than 90% of experts consider cyber
security to be either very or somewhat important for their working environment. However,
this concern does not always align with how board members allocate resources to tackle
cyber risk. Hence, security professionals are tasked to address this emerging threat without
the necessary tools in place [7].
Even though the industry is cognizant of the importance of cyber security, confusion
persists about how serious the cyber threat actually is, the risks that it poses to their
enterprises, and the prioritization it demands. Going beyond the technical interpretation
of cyber security, this paper aims to tackle the following research aim: Identify how cultural
differences affect the level of understanding on maritime cyber security.
It should be highlighted that the paper is constructed based on the data extracted
during two high-profile industry workshops. Members of the research team were invited
to present in these two workshops. As such, an opportunity arose to put together a set
of questions to be shared with the participants to extract valuable data from experts with
deep knowledge of the maritime transport sector. Due to that restriction, the research
environment was not fully controlled by the research team. Research was not conducted in
the typical academic way, but it was a great opportunity to extract raw data and present
it to an academic audience seeking rare true insight knowledge. Therefore, the research
team extracted, analyzed, and present the findings in this paper, so they could provide
rare evidence for an issue of paramount importance for the maritime transport sector.
This paper makes a valuable contribution to current literature by focusing on outcomes
extracted from experts and links them with existing literature.
Following the introduction, the related literature review on the key stakeholders
involved in the maritime transport sector and the illustration of maritime cyber-crime
importance for the sector is presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes the theory that
supports the work conducted from the research team and shows how the data was collected
through a survey. Outcomes of the survey are thoroughly discussed and presented in
Section 4. Section 5 presents a conclusion and proposal for future research.
2. Literature Review
The adoption of new technologies in the global shipping sector, such as office and
shipboard information technology (IT) systems, advanced supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems, and industrial control systems (ICS) enhance maritime
operations that support 90% of world trade [8]. At the same time, these technologies,
despite their benefits, introduce new vulnerabilities and threats to day-to-daily maritime
transport operations. The rapid growth of technology-intense solutions in most cases
does not take security into consideration [9]. In order to deliver transportation services to
their customers, maritime transport stakeholders are now required to take cyber security
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into consideration, as their customers expect them to operate in a secure, digitalized
environment. Hence, it is critical for maritime stakeholders to rise to the challenge of the
newly introduced cyber threat landscape in the maritime transport sector.
2.1. Maritime Transport Sector
The maritime transport sector consists of three main components: (1) mobile assets,
(2) infrastructure, and (3) financial activities. Specifically mobile assets include: ships
and auxiliary platforms. Infrastructure often described as maritime critical infrastructure
includes: port infrastructure, offshore energy infrastructure, safety and security controls,
navigation aids, communication systems (onshore, offshore, satellite), underwater ca-
bles, and pipelines. Finally, financial activities include: insurance agencies and vendors,
booking/charter agencies, and banking-economic transactions [10].
Raising awareness is a challenge in the maritime transport sector, as senior maritime
transport stakeholders are struggling to understand the changing risk environment. Iden-
tifying how cyber threats are affecting their organizations and allocating the necessary
resources to address this is not straightforward. Staff engaged with cyber security are
struggling to provide concrete evidence regarding the return on investment (ROI) for cyber
security measures. This is becoming more difficult due to the abstract nature of cyber
threats. Unlike piracy or extreme weather conditions, the consequences of a cyber breach
are not always visible.
Safety and security at sea has paramount importance for shipping, a sector with a
good safety and security record of accomplishment. Cyber security has been identified as
a key part for maintaining safety and security for ships and port operations. Managing
cyber threats, according to the Maritime Security Strategy [11] and the related Action Plan
of The European Union (EU), is integral to achieving maritime transport security. NATO
acknowledged the importance of the maritime cyber security back in October 2016, when it
organized the first dedicated maritime cyber conference at the NATO Maritime Interdiction
Operations Training Centre (NMIOTC) in Crete [12]. A key initiative aiming to contribute
to the better understanding of cyber risk is the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
guidelines on maritime cyber risk management (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3) and the consequent
IMO resolution MSC 428(98) (July 2017) on maritime cyber risk management in safety
management systems [13,14]. The latter document suggests that, as of 1 January 2021,
all stakeholders engaged in the industry should demonstrate cyber capability.
As cyber risk management is now a requirement of the IMO, it would be expected that
all maritime transport stakeholders should take similar actions in meeting this requirement
and, consequently, address cyber risk within their operating environment. This is not the
case, though. Maritime transport stakeholders around the world adopt a different posture
to the issue. One key reason for this is that the origin of each individual reflects their level
of understanding of a specific topic, including cyber security, as demonstrated in Section 3.
Specifically, the maritime transport sector is multinational in nature as several stakeholders
from various countries are involved. Typically, a ship may be registered in a particular
flag state but may have a crew of many nationalities, none of whom may be from that
country. The owners may be from different countries and the vessel operator may be from
yet another country.
2.2. Flag States
Flag states are national authorities representing the respective country responsible for
establishing and overseeing the regulatory regime governing ship operations within that
country’s registry. Flag states operate their registries according to their domestic laws and
regulations while complying with a set of international codes [15].
The predominant regulatory entity issuing such codes is the IMO. The IMO is a
specialized agency of the United Nations with the authority to regulate maritime affairs,
including international shipping, port safety, and security. Most flag states transpose the
IMO-generated international requirements in their national legislation.
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However, the most popular flag states are considered “open registries” or “flags of
convenience” that do not require a meaningful economic or financial tie to the country of
registry [16]. One of the attractions of open registries is their lower fee structure related to
registering and complying with the flag state’s requirements. They are also less stringent in
their staffing requirements and allow for the hiring of cheaper labor. Ships registered under
these schemes are, in general, considered “lightly regulated”, although some of them are
well managed and highly reputable.
In the wake of the IMO’s decision to incorporate cyber risk management under the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code, a very small number of flag states have
started addressing cyber risk management requirements. An apt example is the USA,
where the US Coast Guard [17] issued the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No.
01-20 “Guidelines for addressing cyber risk at maritime transportation security act (MTSA)
regulated facilities”, providing specific guidance for the incorporation of cyber risks in
safety management systems. Because cyber risks represent a current, clear, and persistent
threat to the maritime transport sector, overall, shipping companies are strongly encour-
aged to go above and beyond the compliance requirements and lay the foundations for
comprehensive cyber security strategy and plans as early as possible.
2.3. Classification Societies
Classification societies are private, not-for-profit organizations that provide quality
assurance to the maritime transport sector. The International Association of Classification
Societies (IACS) is the prominent organization where most classification societies are
members. While these societies were historically based in and focused on certain countries
and markets, they have gradually increased their global representation. Furthermore, those
societies organically grow in countries by establishing offices there and have also followed
the merger and acquisition approach in which two classification societies merge and
grow. The most prominent example is the merge of Norwegian DNV (Det Norske Veritas)
with the German classification society (Germanischer Lloyd) to form a multinational
classification society [18]. There is a large number of additional classification societies that
function similarly.
In line with the IMO resolution regarding cyber risk management, classification
societies have started to introduce detailed guidelines, assessing the cyber security posture
of ships and shipping companies. For example, DNV, ClassNK, and ABS have developed
relevant cyber security guidelines [19–21]. At the same time, classification societies are
responsible for auditing ISM code implementation, which now includes cyber security.
2.4. Maritime Cyber Crime
Having looked at the structure of the maritime transport sector and briefly examined
its response to the IMO cyber regulation, it is important to understand how the sector’s
transition to the digital era can, at the same time, introduce cyber related risks. To illustrate,
one cyber threat campaign, referred to by researchers as the Daily Show, began as a phishing
attack against the shipmaster of a tanker operator [22]. Since the initial infection, which
involved key logger malware, the campaign spread around the world, affecting more
than 50% of the IMO member nations, and infected not only unknown numbers of vessels
and port facilities but also oil/gas, manufacturing, customs agencies, logistics companies,
and banks.
As stated previously, maritime transport companies are constantly adopting new
systems, platforms, and technologies to achieve greater levels of capability and efficiency,
which introduces new risks to their operations. These risks range from email and IT-office
environments to OT systems. The latter is the most important in shipping operations as
it affects ships’ seaworthiness [10]. It can be argued that, in the maritime transport sector
specifically, cyber threats are becoming more frequent and sophisticated, as individual
hackers, well-funded and organized criminal networks, nation states, and others target
ports, shipping companies, vessels, and shore-side facilities. Predominantly, during the
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COVID-19 pandemic, according to MTS-ISAC [23], an increase in cyber attacks in shipping
took place, with some additional reporting from the Nautical Institute, demonstrating that
this increase may have reached up to 900% [24].
Due to its nature, the cyber domain knows no boundaries. Cyber threat actors are
less constrained by geography than connectivity. As shipping is increasingly reliant on
connected technologies, every vessel, shore-based facility, and office represents a potential
target. Vessels are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats, since ship operators (including
management and third-party vendors) regularly access the vessel’s networks and related
operational systems, both physically and remotely. Unpatched operating systems on vessels
with poorly configured networks, open serial ports, and legacy applications represent a
considerable asymmetrical risk to shipping and land-based operations (ports, offices,
and supply chains) [10].
The maritime transport industry has been slow to respond to the growing cyber
threat [2,25]. However, this belated response is not granular throughout. The reasons for
this anomaly are identified and analyzed in this paper.
3. Methodology
3.1. Theory That Supports Our Work
One of the main findings of the analysis relates to the perception of the topic of cyber
security. This is evident throughout the responses collected for the various questions
of the survey, as presented in Section 4. As such, the research team tried to identify a
conceptual framework that justifies this approach. The most apt piece of academic work
that closely aligns with this observation is the book by Nisbett [26], entitled: “The geography
of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently . . . and why”. According to Nisbett [26],
different cultures perceive specific topics in a different way. Specifically, and related to
the composition of participants of this research, East Asian thought is “holistic”, while
Westerners focus on specific subjects. To elaborate, East Asians interpret specific subjects as
part of the whole, examining the relations between objects and events within that discipline.
Applying this concept to maritime cyber security, East Asians perceive cyber security
as another risk factor, part of the overall aggregated risk affecting maritime transport
operations. This argument is reinforced as it is demonstrated from the findings of this
research, presented in Section 4. In contrary, the West approach emphasizes notable subjects
aiming to tackle any challenges related to this through specific attribution. With Nisbett in
mind, applying this concept to maritime cyber security, Western managers perceive cyber
security as a standalone risk element to be dealt with by IT professionals. That demonstrates
a clear differentiation between the mindsets and approaches that the maritime transport
practitioners who participated in the two workshops (Asia and Western representatives)
undertake when dealing with cyber security in the maritime transport sector.
Shipping is a truly global industry, as Kumar and Hoffmann [27] (p. 36) state: “A Greek
owned vessel, built in Korea, may be chartered to a Danish operator, who employs Philippine
seafarers via a Cypriot crewing agent, is registered in Panama, insured in the UK, and transports
German made cargo in the name of a Swiss freight forwarder from a Dutch port to Argentina,
through terminals that are concessioned to port operators from Hong Kong and Australia”. As such,
maritime transport stakeholders, irrespective of their physical location or their racial decent,
should develop a common, fundamental mindset that could grasp the risk factor called
cyber security. That is something difficult to achieve as the sector needs time to develop and
adopt that common mindset. The first step towards that direction is for regulatory bodies
to introduce relevant documentation, either mandatory or advisory. An apt example is
the IMO, with its guidelines and consequent resolution on cyber risk management [13,14],
as analyzed above.
3.2. Data Collection
A unique opportunity was offered to test the theory presented above through direct
engagement with industry experts from Asia and Europe. Data for this paper was collected
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by the authors during two industry-focused workshops. The workshops were designed for
tackling issues related to cyber security in shipping; they were not designed for collecting
academic research data. This was a limiting factor when trying to conduct further statistical
analysis of the collected data, as the research team had no control over participants’ demo-
graphics. However, as several key industry experts participated, it was a great opportunity
to collect data for such a contemporary issue as the challenges posed by cyber threats in
the maritime transport sector. Both events took place in December 2020, virtually, allowing
for stakeholders, from a large number of countries, to participate. Data were collected with
the use of an online tool; it was anonymized and securely stored. Each participant was able
to submit one or multiple responses, as indicated in each question.
The first workshop was conducted by a large Chamber of Commerce based in East
Asia. As aforementioned, data collection was conducted during the workshop and the
questionnaire was designed and tested prior to that. However, the overall event was
not purposely conducted for data collection; as such, data collected was a “by-product”
of the workshop. Therefore, detailed statistics for the demographics of the respondents
are missing. The research team only have information related to the overall number and
country of origin of participants of the workshop. Additionally, during the workshop,
a lively discussion with the participants took place, which indicated their willingness to
share information with authors. During the workshop two authors were main speakers in
the event.
The second workshop was conducted by a large shipping association based in Greece
with representation throughout the EU. Unlike the previous workshop, one of the authors
was the main speaker, presenting the same questionnaire during the session. Similar to the
previous workshop, a lively discussion with the participants took place. Participants were
willing to share additional information with us. Further information is demonstrated in
the following section, where the survey is presented in detail.
Data from both workshops were analyzed instantly from the research team. The analy-
sis was conducted on a regional level but also in combination, so that a better understanding
of the overall responses of the maritime sector could be obtained. The findings are pre-
sented in Section 4. Prior to that, it is demonstrated in the following section how the survey
was designed.
3.3. Survey
As was evident from the aforementioned literature review, cyber attacks in the mar-
itime transport sector have increased substantially over the last decade. For that reason,
the introductory question posed to participants of this survey aims at highlighting the
importance of cyber security in daily operations for the maritime transport sector. Table 1
presents the list of questions used in the survey.
Apart from the initial question, which attempted to understand the importance of
cyber security in the maritime transport sector, the questions composing the survey were
grouped in two themes: (A) How the industry is coping with the new IMO 2021 regulation
requirements; (B) how shipping companies experienced changes in daily operations due to
COVID-19 from the spectrum of cyber security.
The survey was available for responses only during the presentations delivered by the
research team, which helped the participants get a better understanding of each question.
Additionally, clarification was provided, when needed, as a live Q + A session was available,
assisting the submission of full questionnaires, as in some cases participants drop out from
a survey or they leave some questions blank if they do not fully understand them.
This was a unique, impromptu, opportunity to examine experts, and as such, the sur-
vey did not collect participants demographics. Instead, an investigative lead approach was
adopted. Participants represented the whole spectrum of the maritime transport sector (e.g.,
port operators, shipping companies, consultants, ship management companies, technology
solution providers, and academics).
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Table 1. Questions asked during the surveys.
Questions
A How the industry is coping with the new IMO 2021 regulation requirements
1 How important is information (cyber) security to your daily job and activities?
2 Which agency is more suitable to assist and guide the maritime transport sector inaddressing cyber security?
3 Is the IMO 2021 Cyber regulation the answer to cyber security for shipping?
4
How prepared are shipping companies in meeting the IMO 2021 requirements and
consequently addressing cyber security?(Difference in perception in what cyber
security entails)
B How shipping companies experienced changes in daily operations due to COVID-19from the spectrum of cyber security
5 Has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the maritime cyber security landscape?
6 Have you experienced a surge in cyber attacks in your organization during the pandemic?
7 How effective have shipping companies been in adapting to the new norm due to theCOVID-19 Pandemic?
Workshop 1: Up to 200 participants partially attended the event, while half of them
(100) attended the entire event. Participants represented 30 countries.
Workshop 2: The total number of participants was 42, representing a total number of
15 European countries, whilst the majority of the participants were from Greece (a higher
representation from Greece is considered as normal, due to the high representation of
Greeks in the shipping sector).
The findings extracted during the two workshops are presented in the following section.
4. Findings and Discussion
This section presents the data collected, analyzes the findings, and discusses key
points by linking them to the theoretical approach presented in Section 3.
Based on the responses of the introductory question, it became evident that there is a
consensus between maritime professionals regarding the importance of cyber security in
the maritime transport sector. Specifically, the research team examined the importance of
information or cyber security in the daily maritime transport operations, both in Europe
and in Asia, as demonstrated in Figure 1a,b. When European and Asian responses were
combined, it was observed that more than 90% of experts considered cyber security to
be either very or somewhat important for their working environment, as demonstrated
in Figure 2. This evidence shows that cyber security is more relevant presently for the
maritime transport sector.
As shipping is already a heavily regulated industry, where the compliance mindset
remains predominant, the IMO introduced specific guidelines to address cyber security
in shipping. The nature of these guidelines is at a rather high level without offering any
specific insights on their implementation. As such, theme A of this survey aims to explore:
How the industry is coping with the new IMO 2021 regulation requirements. Through this
theme, a novel knowledge approach was introduced, which is needed for future policy
guidance and clarifies any doubts in the long-run.
It was deemed necessary, for the first question, to identify the competent authority
that could provide guidance and assistance on the implementation of the IMO require-
ments. As presented in the literature review, the maritime transport sector consists of
several entities that play a specific role in its successful development over the last century.
Classification societies, P&I clubs, governments, flag states, marine insurance, and regional
and international organizations now have to understand their role in addressing cyber
security in shipping. Unlike the consensus unveiled in the previous question, the responses
collected from the two working groups for this question highlight a significant difference
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2021, 9, 1323 8 of 17
regarding the competent authority for shipping. As demonstrated in Figure 3b, the major-
ity of maritime transport professionals in Asia (53%) state that classification societies are
the predominant authority, suitable to assist and guide the maritime transport sector in
addressing cyber security, followed by governments with 27% and flag states with 10%.
This perception is not shared with their colleagues in Europe, where the IMO, classification
societies, and P&I clubs share equal representation (approximately 25%), as demonstrated
in Figure 3a. At the same time, flag states seem to get similar percentages in both working
groups. An aggregated response of both European and Asian is demonstrated in Figure 4.
As both groups consider classification societies to be the authority to assist the maritime
transport sector in tackling cyber security, it is therefore the highest scoring sector, with
40%, while the second most suitable organizations for tackling cyber security in maritime
transport are governments, with 20%. Therefore, as demonstrated in Figure 4, classifica-
tion societies have more “authority” than governments due to the multinational nature
of shipping.
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is the answer to cyber security for shipping and the other half either disagreeing or not
being able to agree or disagree.




Figure 4. Which agency is more suitable to assist and guide the maritime transport sector in addressing cyber security? 
(Asia and Europe). 
Based on the findings of the previous questions, question 3 from Table 1 goes beyond 
the regulatory requirements and explores if the IMO resolution can effectively protect 
shipping from cyber breaches. As presented in the literature review, industry specific 
press has criticized the IMO cyber resolution as high level and not offering any tangible 
outcomes for its implementation, let alone specific steps for its inclusion in shipping com-
panies’ safety systems. Outcomes presented in Figure 5a,b are aggregated in Figure 6, and 
demonstrate findings regarding the IMO cyber resolution per region, Europe and Asia. 
The responses in Figure 6 are split, with half of the participants agreeing that the IMO 
2021 cyber resolution is the answer to cyber security for shipping and the other half either 
disagreeing or not being able to agree or disagree.  
This split in the responses, which is similar for both the European and Asian partici-
pants of the survey, highlights the issue that the IMO 2021 cyber resolution, unlike other 
IMO guidelines, does not provide a clear answer to the sector’s needs. For example, the 
ballast water management and sulfur cap regulations provide clear instructions on their 
applications, followed by technical specifications. As demonstrated from the findings of 
the survey, the IMO cyber resolution does not clearly pass the message required to the 





































Figure 5. Is the IMO 2 Cyber egulation the answer to cyber se urity for shipping? (a) Europe; (b) Asia.




Figure 6. Is the IMO 2021 Cyber regulation the answer to cyber security for shipping? (Asia and 
Europe). 
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evident when the results from Europe and Asia were combined, as demonstrated in Fig-
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requirements is derived from two main attributes. The first attribute, as presented in the 
analysis of the findings of the previous questions, is that the IMO resolution does not offer 
clear guidance to the sector. Therefore, as it is demonstrated in Figure 7a,b that maritime 
transport stakeholders perceive differently what is required to meet the IMO resolution 
and address cyber security in the maritime transport sector. The second attribute is that 
there is a difference in perception in what cyber security entails. That perception derives 
from the increased technical savviness (as demonstrated in the literature review) com-
pared to European counterparts, who are more “traditional” in operating the sector. Over 
the years, Asian maritime transport stakeholders are amongst the first to apply technology 
solutions that improve operations (e.g., minimize costs, etc.) [28,29]. 
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This split in the responses, which is similar for both the European and Asian par-
ticipants of the survey, highlights th issue that the IMO 2021 cyb r resolution, unlike
other IMO guidelines, does not provide a cl ar answer to the sector’s needs. For xample,
the ballast water management and sulfur cap regulations provide le r instructions on
their applications, followed by technical specifications. As demo s rated fr m the findings
of the survey, the IMO cyber resolution does not clearly pa s the message required o
th sector. Th reason for that is because the IMO resolution is more d script ve rather
than prescriptive.
Expanding on the previ us q estion, the an lysis xplores the level of prep ratio for
shipping companies when meeting the IMO 2021 resolution and, consequently, addressing
cyber security. According to the practitioners who participated in the surv y, and in
contrast to the previous question, a difference between the responses in Europ an Asia
was observed. While nearly half of the respondents in Europe beli ved that th sector is
somewhat prepared (Figure 7a), a roughly similar percentage in Asia believed t e opposite
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the results from Europe and Asia were combined, as demonstrated in Figure 8.
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Following the preliminary analysis regarding the industry’s response to cyber secu-
rity, predominantly concerning the IMO 2021 resolution, the second part of the question-
naire examined the industry’s perception of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in day-
to-day maritime transport operations. 
The first question of theme B explores if the COVID-19 pandemic affected the mari-
time cyber security landscape. Even though this is not a binary question, for matters of 
simplicity, the question was structured as such (yes or no). Responses collected from both 
focus groups in Europe and Asia, as illustrated in Figure 9a,b and summarized in Figure 
10, concur that the cyber security of the maritime transport sector was affected by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
This comes as no surprise, since, as noted previously, the number of cyberattacks 
since the appearance of the pandemic has globally, remarkably increased [23,24,29]. How-
ever, when trying to identify the effect of the pandemic on the maritime cyber security 
landscape, it became evident that respondents from Europe who believed that the indus-
try’s cyber security landscape was not affected, were twice as many as those from Asia, 
enhancing the points discussed in Figure 7a,b regarding the misconceptions about cyber 
security. As aforementioned, this originated from the fact that Asian maritime transport 
stakeholders were amongst the first to apply technology solutions. Therefore, they were 
agnostic to the benefits of digital transformation in the maritime transport sector, along 
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The observed difference in perception on the level of preparedness for the IMO
2021 requirements is derived from two main attributes. The first attribute, as presented
in the analysis of the findings of the previous questions, is that the IMO resolution does
not offer clear guidance to the sector. Therefore, as it is demonstrated in Figure 7a,b that
maritime transport stakeholders perceive differently what is required to meet the IMO
resolution and address cyber security in the maritime transport sector. The second attribute
is that there is a difference in perception in what cyber security entails. That perception
derives from the increased tec nical savviness (as demonstrated i the liter ure review)
compared to European counterparts, who are more “traditional” in operating the sector.
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Over the years, Asian maritime transport stakeholders are amongst the first to apply
technology solutions that improve operations (e.g., minimize costs, etc.) [28,29].
Following the preliminary analysis regarding the industry’s response to cyber security,
predominantly concerning the IMO 2021 resolution, the second part of the questionnaire
examined the industry’s perception of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in day-to-day
maritime transport operations.
The first question of theme B explores if the COVID-19 pandemic affected the maritime
cyber security landscape. Even though this is not a binary question, for matters of simplicity,
the question was structured as such (yes or no). Responses collected from both focus groups
in Europe and Asia, as illustrated in Figure 9a,b and summarized in Figure 10, concur that
the cyber security of the maritime transport sector was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
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The next question of the survey examined whether the participants experienced a 
surge in cyberattacks in their organizations during the pandemic. This question aimed to 
narrow down the analysis, drawing from participants’ direct engagement within their or-
ganizations. While in Europe the responses were split (with 53% mentioning that they did 
not experience a surge in cyber attacks in their organization and 47% mentioning the op-
posite), in Asia, two thirds of the respondents mentioned that they did not experience any 
surge in cyber attacks in their organizations during the pandemic. Figure 11a,b results are 
aggregated in Figure 12, demonstrate that there was an increase by 40% in cyber attacks 
in maritime transport organizations during the pandemic, reinforcing the argument that 
there is a need to increase cyber resilience in the maritime transport sector.  
Looking at the responses presented in Figure 11a,b, an interesting realization that 
reaffirms what has been previously mentioned was identified. Asian maritime experts 
were more advanced in terms of security-minded technology solutions applied within 
their maritime transport organizations, compared to their European counterparts. As 
such, they were able to mitigate incoming malicious content. Having the appropriate 
measures in place and not allowing an increased number of attacks to penetrate their or-
ganizations ecosystem justified the responses presented in Figure 11b. 
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This comes as no surprise, since, as noted previously, the number of cyberattacks since
the appearance of the pandemic has globally, remarkably increased [23,24,29]. However,
when trying to identify the effect of the pandemic on the maritime cyber security landscape,
it became evident that respondents from Europe who believed that the industry’s cyber
securit landsc pe was n t affected, were twice as ma y s those from Asia, enhancing
the points discussed in Figure 7a,b regarding the misconceptions about cyber security.
As aforementioned, this originated from the fact that Asian maritime transport stakeholders
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were amongst the first to apply technology solutions. Therefore, they were agnostic to
the benefits of digital transformation in the maritime transport sector, along with the
consequent potential cyber risks that they may face.
The next question of the survey examined whether the participants experienced a
surge in cyberattacks in their organizations during the pandemic. This question aimed
to narrow down the analysis, drawing from participants’ direct engagement within their
organizations. While in Europe the responses were split (with 53% mentioning that they
did not experience a surge in cyber attacks in their organization and 47% mentioning the
opposite), in Asia, two thirds of the respondents mentioned that they did not experience
any surge in cyber attacks in their organizations during the pandemic. Figure 11a,b results
are aggregated in Figure 12, demonstrate that there was an increase by 40% in cyber attacks
in maritime transport organizations during the pandemic, reinforcing the argument that
there is a need to increase cyber resilience in the maritime transport sector.
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Similar to question 4, presented in Table 1 and analyzed above, the last question of 
the survey tried to identify the level of effectiveness of shipping companies in adapting to 
the new norm, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This new norm entailed: (A) an increased 
number of employees working remotely (from home), (B) the adoption of digital solutions 
to facilitate this transition, and (C) uptake in number of cyber attacks affecting the indus-
try.  
As demonstrated in Figure 13a,b, 86% of European participants mentioned that ship-
ping companies were either very or somewhat effective in adapting to the new norm. In 
comparison, opinions on the same matter from Asian participants were limited to almost 
half of the percentage demonstrated above (46% were either very or somewhat effective). 
Overall, Figure 14 illustrates that a strong majority of industry practitioners (68%) be-
lieved that the industry was effective in adapting to the new norm due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
The difference in responses illustrated in Figure 13a,b reaffirms the trend identified 
throughout this survey regarding the level of maturity and understanding of what cyber 
security entails between the European and Asian participants. With reference to the find-
ings of Figure 14, this comes as no surprise, as, unlike other industries, shipping, due to 
its nature, is used to having its most valuable assets operating remotely. Ships operating 
globally, thousand miles away from their shipping company’s offices, have established 
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Looking at the responses presented in Figure 11a,b, an interesting realization that
reaffirms what has been previously mentioned was identified. Asian m ritime experts
were more advanced in terms of security-minded technology solutions applied within
their maritime transport organizations, compared to their European counterparts. As such,
they were able to mitigate incoming malicious content. Having the appropriate measures
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in place and not allowing an increased number of attacks to penetrate their organizations
ecosystem justified the responses presented in Figure 11b.
Similar to question 4, presented in Table 1 and analyzed above, the last question of
the survey tried to identify the level of effectiveness of shipping companies in adapting to
the new norm, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This new norm entailed: (A) an increased
number of employees working remotely (from home), (B) the adoption of digital solutions
to facilitate this transition, and (C) uptake in number of cyber attacks affecting the industry.
As demonstrated in Figure 13a,b, 86% of European participants mentioned that ship-
ping companies were either very or somewhat effective in adapting to the new norm. In
comparison, opinions on the same matter from Asian participants were limited to almost
half of the percentage demonstrated above (46% were either very or somewhat effective).
Overall, Figure 14 illustrates that a strong majority of industry practitioners (68%) believed
that the industry was effective in adapting to the new norm due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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In this section, the findings of the survey were demonstrated and discussed. Section 
5 summarizes the key points of this research. 
5. Conclusions 
It became apparent throughout the paper that the increased adoption of digital solu-
tions in the maritime transport sector introduces an insidious threat in cyber space. Ports 
and ships, being two of the most vital components of the supply chain, are vulnerable to 
cyber breaches, due to their complex operational environments. Both ships and ports have 
IT and OT systems composed by various third-party vendors, which, in most cases, re-
quire remote access, increasing cyber attacks to surface. Thus, maritime transport stake-
holders have to take prompt actions in order to mitigate cyber risk. In order for this to 
happen, first and foremost, maritime transport stakeholders should understand what 
cyber security is; how it may affect their business; and the specific countermeasures that 
are suitable for their organization, and consequently adopt them to tackle these threats.  
This research, unlike mainstream academic approaches, was initiated from the data 
collected during two targeted workshops, with the participation of more than 250 senior 
maritime transport practitioners. Due to the limitation of the research environment and 
the level of control available to the research team, it was decided not to over interpret the 
data with the use of quantitative statistical methods. The research team believes that its 
analysis will satisfy social scientists in terms of interpreting data collected in this activity 
by using a qualitative lens. 
This impromptu engagement was commonly themed in order to address one key 
industry concern: whether cultural differences affect the level of understanding of mari-
time cyber security. As the two workshops were conducted virtually in Asia and Europe, 
it was realized that the predominant perception for cyber risk differs in these two geo-
graphical areas. The main analysis has reiterated that each group had a different under-
standing. A similar observation was conducted by Nisbett [26], who mentions that differ-
ent cultures perceive specific topics in a different view. As stated by Nisbett and reaf-
firmed by our findings, East Asians think “holistically”, while Westerners focus on spe-
cific subjects. This differentiation can also be attributed to the level of maturity regarding 
cyber security, as presented in the findings section. As such, Asians understand cyber se-
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The difference in responses illustrated in Figure 13a,b reaffirms the trend identified
throughout this survey regarding the level of maturity and understanding of what cyber
security entails between the European and Asian participants. With reference to the
findings of Figure 14, this comes as no surprise, as, unlike other industries, shipping, due
to its nature, is used to having its most valuable assets operating remotely. Ships operating
globally, thousand miles away from their shipping company’s offices, have established
procedures and technology solutions for decades.
In this section, the findings of the survey were demonstrated and discussed. Section 5
summarizes the key points of this research.
5. Conclusions
It became apparent throughout the paper that the increased adoption of digital solu-
tions in the maritime transport sector introduces an insidious threat in cyber space. Ports
and ships, being two of the most vital components of the supply chain, are vulnerable to
cyber breaches, due to their complex operational environments. Both ships and ports have
IT and OT systems composed by various third-party vendors, which, in most cases, require
remote access, increasing cyber attacks to surface. Thus, maritime transport stakeholders
have to take prompt actions in order to mitigate cyber risk. In order for this to happen,
first and foremost, maritime transport stakeholders should understand what cyber security
is; how it may affect their business; and the specific countermeasures that are suitable for
their organization, and consequently adopt them to tackle these threats.
This research, unlike mainstream academic approaches, was initiated from the data
collected during two targeted workshops, with the participation of more than 250 senior
maritime transport practitioners. Due to the limitation of the research environment and the
level of control available to the research team, it was decided not to over interpret the data
with the use of quantitative statistical methods. The research team believes that its analysis
will satisfy social scientists in terms of interpreting data collected in this activity by using a
qualitative lens.
This impromptu engagement was commonly themed in order to address one key
industry concern: whether cultural differences affect the level of understanding of maritime
cyber security. As the two workshops were conducted virtually in Asia and Europe, it was
realized that the predominant perception for cyber risk differs in these two geographical
areas. The main analysis has reiterated that each group had a different understanding.
A similar observation was conducted by Nisbett [26], who mentions that different cultures
perceive specific topics in a different view. As stated by Nisbett and reaffirmed by our
findings, East Asians think “holistically”, while Westerners focus on specific subjects.
This differentiation can also be attributed to the level of maturity regarding cyber security,
as presented in the findings section. As such, Asians understand cyber security challenges
better and consequently incorporate them in their aggregated business risk management.
In contrast, the less mature Western maritime transport stakeholders perceive cyber security
as an impartial risk factor to be dealt in isolation.
Findings presented in this research highlight that many maritime transport stake-
holders are not aware of what cyber security entails and do not fully realize the degree
of dependence of their businesses on software-enabled systems, platforms, and services.
While they might acknowledge the existence of cyber threats in general terms, as apparent
in Section 4, they miss important details; understanding how these cyber threats can affect
their organizations’ daily operations. A holistic approach to cyber risk management begins
at the senior management level and extends downwards to the entire organization.
Future Research
Acknowledging that this paper was elaborated based on an opportunity that arose
from the authors’ engagement with the industry, we believe that further, targeted, academic
research is to be conducted, with statistical tools, such as ANOVA, in mind. To achieve
that, the research outline should include details of targeted audience profiles, along with a
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questionnaire, which will be designed to collect information related to participants and their
demographics. Such an approach would facilitate the implementation of aforementioned
statistical tools and thus present a statistical analysis of the results. Specifically, future
research should explore two main topics: (1) revalidate our findings as to how cultural
differences affect the level of understanding of a specific topic, in this case maritime cyber
security, with further research, such as longitudinal research, which could enhance our
findings; (2) explore whether the surge in cyber attacks, partially due to pandemic, affected
the sector’s response to the IMO cyber requirements. This research should take place in
a more academic style, where the theory should be tested against our main finding, that
there is a different perception of cyber risk based on cultural background. To achieve this,
enhanced collaboration between all key stakeholders (academics, cyber experts, maritime
transport sector stakeholders) should take place. As we initiated this piece of research, due
to our wide links with maritime transport stakeholders, we would happily participate in
any future discussions, which we are sure will take place soon due to the urgent need to
tackle such an important issue as maritime cyber risk management.
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